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I. INTRODUCTION
The denial of due process in parole revocation simply mirrors soci-
ety's overall attitude of degradation and defilement of a convicted
felon. It is sad 20th Century Commentary that society views the con-
victed felon as a social outcast. He has done wrong, so we rationalize
and condone punishment in various forms. We express a desire for
rehabilitation of the individual, while simultaneously we do every-
thing to prevent it. Society cares little for the conditions which a pris-
oner must suffer while in prison; it cares even less for his future when
he is released from prison. He is a marked man. We tell him to retum
to the norm of behavior, yet we brand him as virtually unemployable;
he is required to live with his normal activities severely restricted and
we react with sickened wonder and disgust when he returns to a life
of crime.'
Imagine you are convicted of a felony and sentenced to ten years in
t J.D. Candidate 2010, University of Miami School of Law.
1. Doe v. Miller, 298 F. Supp. 2d 844, 846 (S.D. Iowa 2004), (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer,
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prison. Every day for those ten years, you look forward to being free.
However, upon completion of your prison sentence, you may reconsider
your desire to be part of society again, depending on what type of felony
you committed. If you committed a robbery, you are now free to live
anywhere you want, even next to the store that you robbed. However, if
you are a sex offender, you may have to resort to homelessness due to a
residency restriction for sex offenders, and wish you were back in
2prison.
Perhaps no criminal is subject to more severe restrictions after serv-
ing his prison sentence than the sex offender. Not only must sex offend-
ers register with law enforcement and deal with limited housing
availability, 3 but they also face a social stigma that prevents them from
being rehabilitated and rejoining society.4 In fact, "research has shown
that isolation, unemployment, depression, and instability . . . correlate
with increased recidivism," which is exactly what residency restrictions
are meant to prevent.5 Nonetheless, sex offender residency restrictions
currently exist in twenty-two states, 6 and twelve states had bills to estab-
443 F.2d 942, 952-53 (8th Cir. 1971) (Lay, J., dissenting), rev'd, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)), rev'd, 405
F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005).
2. Jill Levenson et al., Sex Offender Residence Restrictions: Sensible Crime Policy or
Flawed Logic?, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 2007, at 2, 4 ("Within six months of the implementation of
Iowa's 2,000-foot law, thousands of sex offenders became homeless or transient .... ); see also
DYERSVILLE, IOWA, CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 49, § 3 (2005), available at http://www.cityofdyers
ville.comlCityAdServ/Ordinances/Chapter49.pdf ("A sex offender shall not reside within the
corporate City limits of Dyersville.").
3. Levenson et al., supra note 2, at 4 ("[I]n Orange County, Florida .... 95 percent of over
137,000 residences were located within 1,000 feet of schools, parks, daycare centers, or school
bus stops, and virtually all housing was within 2,500 feet of such venues.").
4. Id. (noting that known sex offenders suffer unemployment, relationship loss, denial of
housing, threats, harassment, physical assault, or property damage, in addition to "psychological
symptoms such as shame, embarrassment, depression, or hopelessness").
5. Brief Amicus Curiae of Ass'n for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers in Support of Petition
for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Doe v. Miller, 546 U.S. 1034 (2005) (No. 05-428).
6. Chiraag Bains, Comment, Next-Generation Sex Offender Statutes: Constitutional
Challenges to Residency, Work, and Loitering Restrictions, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 483, 483
& n.5 (2007) (citing ALA. CODE § 15-20-26 (LexisNexis 2006) (amended 2009); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 5-14-128 (2003) (amended 2009); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3003.5 (West 2007); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, § 1112 (2006); FLA. STAT. § 794.065 (2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (2006); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 18-8329 (2006) (amended 2008); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-9.3(b-5) (West
2002 & Supp. 2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-1 1(c) (West 2006); IOwA CODE ANN. § 692A.2A
(West 2003); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.545 (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.1 (2004)
(amended 2009); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.735 (West 2006); Miss. CODE ANN. § 45-33-25
(West 2006) (amended 2008); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.147 (West 2006), invalidated in part by
R.L. v. Dep't of Corr., 245 S.W.3d 236 (Mo. 2008) (en banc) (amended 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§14-208.16 (2006) (amended 2007); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.031(A) (West 2006); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 590 (West 2004 & Supp. 2006); OR. REv. STAT. § 144.642 (2006); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-24B-22 to -23 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-211 (2007) (amended
2009); TEX. CODE CIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 42.12(13B) (Vernon 2005)).
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lish residency restrictions pending between 2005 and 2007, 7 because
legislatures believe that the negative effects the restrictions have on sex
offenders are outweighed by the state's interest in protecting children
from sex offender recidivism.8
Sex offender residency restrictions have consistently been chal-
lenged as unconstitutional and ineffective. While the Supreme Court has
never ruled on the constitutionality of sex offender residency restric-
tions, Doe v. Miller,9 which upheld Iowa's sex offender residency stat-
ute,1 ° analyzed several constitutional issues. The Supreme Court denied
the sex offenders' petition for writ of certiorari in 2005,1 but because of
the increasing number and severity of residency restrictions, there is
bound to be sufficient statistical evidence that such restrictions are inef-
fective, which could prompt the Supreme Court to consider a restriction
and strike it down. However, even if courts continue to uphold the
restrictions, legislatures should be aware of the risk that the restrictions
are ineffective, and possibly counter to their purpose.
This casenote will examine restrictions placed on sex offenders fol-
lowing completion of their prison sentences, how courts have handled
challenges to the restrictions, and whether those courts' rulings were
correct. Part II provides a brief history of post-sentence restrictions
placed on certain types of criminals, and specifically, sex offenders. Part
III discusses the Eighth Circuit's Doe v. Miller decision and its constitu-
tional analysis. Part IV then concludes that because the court in Doe v.
Miller did not go out of its way to specify that its ruling only applied to
the statute in front of it and could not be applied to other residency
restrictions, there is a risk that courts will rely on the decision to uphold
more restrictive residency restrictions in the future.
7. Corey Rayburn Yung, Banishment by a Thousand Laws: Residency Restrictions on Sex
Offenders, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 101, 103 & n.17 (2007); see, e.g., H.R. 2380, 47th Leg., 2d Reg.
Sess. (Ariz. 2006); H.R. 1089, 65th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2006).
8. See, e.g., Lisa Henderson, Comment, Sex Offenders: You Are Now Free to Move About
the Country. An Analysis of Doe v. Miller's Effects on Sex Offender Residential Restrictions, 73
UMKC L. REV. 797, 798-99 (2005) ("[S]ex offenders are 'virtually impossible to rehabilitate and
these crimes are so difficult to detect and control, those persons who are convicted of sexual
offenses against children and thus, are apt to be repeat offenders, must have at least some
restrictions on the location of their residence."' (quoting Samantha Imber, Crimes and Offenses:
Sexual Offenses: Prohibit Sexual Predators From Residing Within Proximity of Schools or Areas
Where Minors Congregate, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 100, 101 (2003) (discussing a state senator's
public comments on sex offenders))).
9. 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005).
10. IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.2A (West 2003).
11. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1034 (2005).
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II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Criminals with Post-Sentence Restrictions'
2
The Tennessee Code conditions the restoration of felons' voting
rights upon their payment of certain financial obligations, namely resti-
tution and child support. 3 In Johnson v. Bredesen, the court upheld that
provision of the Tennessee Code on the ground that it did not violate the
Twenty Fourth Amendment or the Ex Post Facto Clause. 4
The Twenty Fourth Amendment states that the right to vote cannot
be conditioned upon payment of a poll tax.' 5 In Johnson, the court ruled
that "[i]t is not unreasonable or impermissible for a state to require a
convicted felon to complete his entire sentence, including the payment
of restitution, prior to having his voting rights restored."' 6 Additionally,
regarding the condition of child support payments, the court found that
payment of child support is not considered part of a criminal's sen-
tence-it is a legal obligation arising from a court order.' 7 Thus, child
support payments are not a "tax" on voting, and subsections (b) and (c)
of § 40-29-202 do not violate the Twenty Fourth Amendment. 8
While the Twenty Fourth Amendment is at issue for some post-
12. While sex offender residency restrictions are the focus of this casenote, a brief description
of post-sentence restrictions placed on other categories of criminals and how courts have treated
them will precede the analysis of post-sentence restrictions on sex offenders to illustrate that
courts are reluctant to strike down such restrictions in the face of constitutionally based
challenges.
13. The statute states in relevant part:
(b)... [A] person shall not be eligible to apply for a voter registration card and have
the right of suffrage restored, unless the person has paid all restitution to the victim
or victims of the offense ordered by the court as part of the sentence.
(c)... [A] person shall not be eligible to apply for a voter registration card and have
the right of suffrage restored, unless the person is current in all child support
obligations.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-29-202 (2006); see also Neema Trivedi, Op-Ed., Ease Ex-Offenders'
Voting Restrictions, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Oct. 9, 2006, available at http://www.freerepublic.com/
focus/f-news/1716299/posts (discussing statute similar to Tennessee Code section 40-29-202 that
exists in Arizona, and stating that, in 2006, it prohibited more than 140,000 individuals who had
completed their prison sentences from voting).
14. 579 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1048 (M.D. Tenn. 2008). The court also held that the provision
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. However, this note
will not discuss that issue because it is collateral to the issue of post-incarceration restrictions.
15. The Twenty Fourth Amendment states:
The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for
President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for
Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.
U.S. Co sT. amend. XXIV, § 1.
16. Johnson, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1058-59 (footnote omitted).
17. Id. at 1059.
18. Id.
1094
IOWA'S SEX OFFENDER RESIDENCY RESTRICTION
sentence restrictions, the Ex Post Facto Clause is the more pertinent
issue to post-sentence restrictions on sex offenders. In Johnson, disen-
franchised felons claimed that the Tennessee Code retroactively
increased their penalties because subsections (b) and (c) of § 40-29-202
were enacted after the felons had been sentenced, thus violating the Ex
Post Facto Clause.' 9 The court stated that payment of child support as a
condition to voting does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because it
does not increase "the penalty by which [a] crime is punishable.
2 °
B. Sex Offender Post-Sentence Restrictions
1. PURPOSE OF POST-SENTENCE RESTRICTIONS ON SEX OFFENDERS
"Sexual predators are some of the most feared and despised crimi-
nal offenders in society."'" While restrictions placed on sex offenders
may be emotionally charged based on anger towards the offenders, leg-
islatures use the rationale of fear when enacting the restrictions-fear
that the sex offenders will re-offend against vulnerable children. 22 The
fear is founded upon the belief that "[t]hey can't help themselves"
23
from committing crimes that are "so offensive to human dignity and so
atrocious that many [citizens] would be comfortable using any means
necessary to prevent even the possibility of re-offense."2 4
2. SEX OFFENDER RESTRICTIONS
a. Sex Offender Registration Laws
In 1994, in New Jersey, seven-year-old Megan Kanka disappeared,
and after the police questioned several individuals, Jesse Timmende-
19. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall ... pass any.. . ex post facto
Law ....").
20. Johnson, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1060 (quoting Cal. Dep't of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499,
506 n.3 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted). A more extensive ex post facto analysis will
be described later in this casenote in relation to sex offender residency restrictions.
21. Megan A. Janicki, Note, Better Seen Than Herded: Residency Restrictions and Global
Positioning System Tracking Laws for Sex Offenders, 16 B.U. PuB. INT. L.J. 285, 285 (2007).
22. See Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 4 (2003) ("Sex offenders are a serious
threat in this Nation. [T]he victims of sex assault are most often juveniles, and [w]hen convicted
sex offenders reenter society, they are much more likely than any other type of offender to be re-
arrested for a new rape or sexual assault." (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting
McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 32-33 (2002) (plurality opinion)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
23. Janicki, supra note 21, at 285 (alteration in original) (quoting Robert F. Worth, Exiling
Sex Offenders from Town; Questions About Legality and Effectiveness, N.Y. TuMEs, Oct. 3, 2005,
at BI).
24. Id. at 285-86 (alteration in original) (quoting Doe v. Miller, 298 F. Supp. 2d 844, 846
(S.D. Iowa 2004), rev'd, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005)). However, critics of residency restrictions
placed on sex offenders point out that "[t]here is no evidence ... that residential proximity to
schools or parks affects re-offense." Miller, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 876 (alterations in original).
2010] 1095
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quas, who lived across the street from the victim, confessed to the loca-
tion of Megan's body, "where it was discovered that she was raped,
sodomized, and strangled to death. 25 Timmendequas was charged and
convicted for the murder of Megan.26 Megan's parents were informed
that Timmendequas had "previous convictions for sexual offenses
against young children. '2 7 As a result, they campaigned for the state
legislature to enact Megan's Law under the premise that "[e]very parent
should have the right to know if a dangerous sexual predator moves into
their neighborhood. '28 New Jersey passed Megan's Law three months
after Megan's death.29
The purpose of Megan's Law is to "provid[e] a means of protecting
the public, especially our children, from victimization by sexual offend-
ers."3 Megan's Law seeks to achieve its goal by "tracking the wherea-
bouts of convicted sex offenders and providing notification to the public
of the presence of a sex offender in [the] community."31 Thus, the law
requires convicted sex offenders to register with the state and requires
law enforcement to give notice to the public that a registered sex
offender lives in their community.32
Even though Megan's Law is seen as the first legislation of its kind,
at least twenty-five other states had required sex offenders to register
with law enforcement officials at the completion of their prison sen-
tence.33 While most states did not adopt sex offender registration statutes
until the 1990S, 34 California was the first to adopt a registration require-
ment for sex offenders in 1947.35
States are now required to adopt their own form of Megan's Law
under the Wetterling Act, which Congress passed in 1994 after the
enactment of the first Megan's Law. 36 As punishment for not adopting a
25. Karen A. Salvemini, Comment, Sex-Offender Parents: Megan's Law and Schools' Legal
Options in Protecting Students Within Their Walls, 17 WIDENER L.J. 1031, 1035 (2008).
26. State v. Timmendequas, 737 A.2d 55, 64 (N.J. 1999).
27. Salvemini, supra note 25, at 1035 (quoting Maureen S. Hopbell, Comment, Balancing the
Protection of Children Against the Protection of Constitutional Rights: The Past, Present and
Future of Megan's Law, 42 DUQ. L. REV. 331, 336 (2004)).
28. Megan Nicole Kanka Foundation, Inc., http://www.megannicolekankafoundation.org/
mission.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2009).
29. Salvemini, supra note 25, at 1035.
30. Pennsylvania State Police Megan's Law Website, http://www.pameganslaw.state.pa.us
(follow "Frequently Asked Questions" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 29, 2009).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Hopbell, supra note 27, at 337 (citing Jerry Gray, Sex Offender Legislation Passes in the
Senate, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 4, 1994, at B6).
34. Salvemini, supra note 25, at 1034 (citing Janicki, supra note 21, at 289).
35. Id.
36. See Hopbell, supra note 27, at 339 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2006)).
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Megan's Law under the Wetterling Act, states forfeit their right to a
portion of the federal funding allocated under the Omnibus Crime Bill.
3 7
Under this pressure, "by 1996, every state and the District of Columbia
had enacted a version of Megan's Law legislation.
38
The Supreme Court has twice upheld state sex offender registration
laws. In Smith v. Doe, the Supreme Court upheld Alaska's registration
law against an ex post facto challenge.39 Under the Alaska Sex Offender
Registration Act, a sex offender is required to register with the Depart-
ment of Corrections or local law enforcement within thirty days before
his release from jail, or within one business day of entering the state if
the sex offender is not still incarcerated, even if the sex offender was
convicted before the Act's passage.40 Because the legislature's intent
was to establish "civil proceedings," rather than to impose a punishment,
the Court held that the law did not unconstitutionally violate the Ex Post
Facto Clause."
The Court also upheld a state sex offender registration law in Con-
necticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe.42 A convicted sex offender
challenged the law's provision requiring the Department of Public
Safety to post the sex offender registry containing sex registrants'
names, addresses, photographs, and descriptions on an Internet website
and to make the registry available to the public as violative of the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.43 The Court ruled that "mere
injury to reputation, even if defamatory, does not constitute the depriva-
tion of a liberty interest."'"
b. Federal Rules of Evidence
The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994
("Violent Crime Act")45 amended the Federal Rules of Evidence and
"modifie[d] the longstanding rule barring evidence of a defendant's
character as proof of action in conformity therewith on a particular occa-
sion."4 6 The Act added Rules 413, 414, and 415 to the Federal Rules of
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 538 U.S. 84, 105-06 (2003).
40. Id. at 90-91.
41. Id. at 92, 96 (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997)).
42. 538 U.S. 1, 7-8 (2003).
43. Id. at 4-6.
44. Id. at 6-7 (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)).
45. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
46. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, 2 FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 4:85, at
355-56 (3d ed. 2007).
10972010]
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Evidence.47 Rules 41348 and 41449 permit the introduction of sex
offenses into evidence as character evidence to prove action in conform-
ity therewith. Rule 415 simply applies Rules 413 and 414 to civil
cases.
50
Ever since these Rules were initially proposed, they "have been met
with hostility by the legal establishment."'5' The Judicial Conference's
Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, with what was noted as
"highly unusual unanimity," ardently opposed the new rules, fearing that
they "could diminish significantly the protections that have safeguarded
persons accused in criminal cases and parties in civil cases against
undue prejudice."52
Even though there was strong opposition to Rules 413-415, the
Violent Crime Act was the result of a public response to several high-
profile crimes against children. 3 While this public response indicates
that the Rules may have been adopted to punish sex offenders, there are
47. See § 320935, 108 Stat. at 2135-37.
48. FED. R. EvID. 413:
(a) In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of sexual
assault, evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses of
sexual assault is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to
which it is relevant.
(b) In a case in which the Government intends to offer evidence under this rule, the
attorney for the Government shall disclose the evidence to the defendant, including
statements of witnesses or a summary of the substance of any testimony that is
expected to be offered, at least fifteen days before the scheduled date of trial or at
such later time as the court may allow for good cause.
49. FED. R. EvID. 414:
(a) In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of child
molestation, evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses
of child molestation is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any
matter to which it is relevant.
50. FED. R. EVID. 415:
(a) In a civil case in which a claim for damages or other relief is predicated on a
party's alleged commission of conduct constituting an offense of sexual assault or
child molestation, evidence of that party's commission of another offense or
offenses of sexual assault or child molestation is admissible and may be considered
as provided in Rule 413 and Rule 414 of these rules.
51. Johnson v. Elk Lake Sch. Dist., 283 F.3d 138, 151 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ON THE ADMISSION OF
CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN CERTAIN SEXUAL MISCONDUCT CASES (1995), reprinted in 159 F.R.D.
51, 52 (1995) [hereinafter JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT]).
52. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 51, at 53.
53. Mueller, supra note 46, at 357 (noting that just a year earlier, "12-year-old Polly Kass
had been raped and murdered in California. Just months before the [crime] bill passed, seven-
year-old Megan Kanka had been raped and murdered in New Jersey, and both crimes were
committed by men with previous convictions for child molesting.").
1098
IOWA'S SEX OFFENDER RESIDENCY RESTRICTION
evidential reasons for allowing prior sex offenses to be admitted. Rules
413-415 permit the use of prior sex offenses to prove character, and
action in conformity therewith, based on the belief that persons who
commit sex offenses are peculiarly likely to be repeat offenders.54 Addi-
tionally, in trials for sexual assault and child molestation, so much turns
on who the fact finder believes; however, victims of sex offenses "often
cannot testify effectively, and there is a great risk . . . that having to
testify is itself traumatic, and perhaps damaging over the long run, to the
victim. ' '55 Notwithstanding legislative belief that evidence of a prior sex
offense is extremely probative of the commission of a later sex offense,
the probative value is not automatically high enough such that the
admission of such evidence is exempt from Rule 403's balancing test;
56
thus, for a prior sex offense to be admissible, the probative value of the
prior sex offense must not be substantially outweighed by the risk of
unfair prejudice.57
c. Iowa's Sex Offender Residency Restriction
As a result of legislatures' and the public's fear of sex offenders
recidivating, states began passing residency restriction laws almost a
decade ago.58 State residency restrictions typically prohibit sex offenders
from residing within a certain distance-sometimes as far as two-thou-
sand feet-of schools, day cares, and sometimes even any area where
children congregate. 59 Generally, local residency restrictions are even
stricter than state restrictions.60 For example, local residency restrictions
may prohibit sex offenders from "living, working, or . . . even being
within 2,500 feet of a school, day care [facility], park, or school bus
stop. '"61 Sex offenders cannot even drive through Binghamton, New
54. Id. (citing Rivera v. Rivera, 262 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1226 (D. Kan. 2003) (noting that a
history of molestation is "exceptionally probative" in showing "an unusual disposition" that "does
not exist in ordinary people"); see Daniel M. Filler, Making the Case for Megan's Law: A Study in
Legislative Rhetoric, 76 IND. L.J. 315, 335-36 (2001) (describing legislative reactions to high
recidivism rates for sexual predators).
55. Mueller, supra note 46, at 356.
56. See FED. R. EvID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence.").
57. See Mueller, supra note 46, § 4:86, at 361-62.
58. Janicki, supra note 21, at 291 (citing Worth, supra note 23).
59. IowA CODE ANN. § 692A.2A (West 2003); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (Supp.
2009) (stating that registered sex offenders cannot live within one thousand feet of "any child care
facility, church, school, or area where minors congregate").
60. See Janicki, supra note 21, at 291-92.
61. Worth, supra note 23.
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York.62 Ely, Iowa "'passed an ordinance banning sex offenders from
residing in nearly the entire town,' despite the fact that not a single
school or day care exists within town lines. '"63
Iowa's residency restriction rivals local restrictions, as it is one of
the most restrictive state laws.' Passed by the Iowa Legislature in the
spring of 2002 and effective on July 1, 2002,65 section 692A.2A of the
Iowa Code provides that a sex offender "shall not reside within two
thousand feet of the real property comprising a public or nonpublic ele-
mentary or secondary school or a child care facility. 66 Iowa defines
"residence" as "the place where a person sleeps, which may include
more than one location, and may be mobile or transitory. 67 In addition
to being broad in its restrictions, the Iowa statute is also broad in how
many people it applies to. 68 At the close of 2003, Iowa had approxi-
62. Janicki, supra note 21, at 292; James Bone, Child Molesters Sue the City that Banned
Them, TIMES (U.K.), Aug. 25, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 13364494.
63. Janicki, supra note 21, at 292 (citing Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Asks U.S. Supreme
Court to Review Iowa's Sex Offender Residency Restriction (Sept. 29, 2005), available at http://
www.aclu.org//crimjustice/gen/20127prs20050929.html).
64. § 692A.2A.
65. Michael J. Duster, Note, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: State Attempts to Banish Sex
Offenders, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 711, 720-21 (2005).
66. § 692A.2A. The entire statute provides:
1. For purposes of this section, "person" means a person who has committed a
criminal offense against a minor, or an aggravated offense, sexually violent offense,
or other relevant offense that involved a minor.
2. A person shall not reside within two thousand feet of the real property
comprising a public or nonpublic elementary or secondary school or a child care
facility.
3. A person who resides within two thousand feet of the real property comprising a
public or nonpublic elementary or secondary school, or a child care facility,
commits an aggravated misdemeanor.
4. A person residing within two thousand feet of the real property comprising a
public or nonpublic elementary or secondary school or a child care facility does not
commit a violation of this section if any of the following apply:
a. The person is required to serve a sentence at a jail, prison, juvenile facility, or
other correctional institution or facility.
b. The person is subject to an order of commitment under chapter 229A.
c. The person has established a residence prior to the July 1, 2002, or a school or
child care facility is newly located on or July 1, 2002 [sic].
d. The person is a minor or a ward under a guardianship.
Id.
67. Id. § 692A. 1(8) (2003 & Supp. 2009). Ohio has a broader definition of "residence," which
further limits the areas sex offenders can live. See Duster, supra note 65, at 721 n.55 (citing 2005
Ohio Op. Att'y Gen. 2-1 (2005) (stating that a residence in Ohio includes "premises in a nursing
home, adult care facility, residential group home, homeless shelter, hotel, motel, boarding house,
or facility operated by an independent housing agency that is located within 1000 feet of any
school premises")).
68. Duster, supra note 65, at 722.
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mately 5,674 registered sex offenders.69 Of those sex offenders, 5,073,
or eighty-three percent, had preyed on minors.7 °
While Iowa's statute has been challenged as unconstitutional, it has
also been criticized as not being strict enough to meet its intended pur-
pose-to protect the community.7' Even though Iowa's statute restricts
where sex offenders can reside, it does not prohibit sex offenders from
simply being in the restricted area, as some of its local counterparts do.72
In other words, the "affected persons are free to travel, work, or gener-
ally move about within any area."
73
Although Iowa's statute has been criticized as not being broad
enough in that it does not prohibit sex offenders from being within 2,000
feet of a school or day care facility, in reality there is no risk that sex
offenders will be anywhere near a school in some cities because there is
nowhere sex offenders can live in those cities. In Johnson County, Iowa,
for example, "a map of Iowa City showing the restricted areas was
described as having 'virtually no place ... for a sex offender to live.' ,
74
Additionally, sex offenders are effectively banned from residing in Des
Moines, the largest city in Iowa.75 The only areas in Des Moines not off-
limits to sex offenders by Iowa's statute are "industrial areas or some of
the city's newest and most expensive neighborhoods. 76
Towns like Davenport and Bettendorf, due to their 344 day-care
facilities and thirty-four schools, are also almost completely covered by
Iowa's statute. 77 In Bettendorf, the only areas not covered by the resi-
dency restriction are "a golf course, a mall, and a few affluent neighbor-
hoods. '78 The effect of Iowa's broad restriction is to banish sex
offenders from "many small towns or densely populated cities."79 Sex
offenders do not even have the choice of being homeless in those cities
where they are almost completely banned because, in Des Moines for
example, sex offenders are "not allowed to sleep in homeless shelters."8
An additional effect of Iowa's statute is "forced . . . 'involuntary civil




72. Id. (citing Miller, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 849).
73. Id. (quoting Doe v. Miller, 216 F.R.D. 462, 464 (S.D. Iowa 2003)).
74. Id. at 723 (alteration in original) (quoting Miller, 216 F.R.D. at 468).
75. Id. (citing Miller, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 851).
76. Id. (quoting Miller, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 851).
77. Id. (citing Marc Chase, Sex Offenders in Q-C Have Few Places to Live, QUAD CITY TIMES
(Davenport, Iowa), Feb. 8, 2003, at Al).
78. Id. (citing Chase, supra note 77).
79. Id. at 722 (citing All Things Considered (NPR radio broadcast, Jan. 9, 2003).
80. Id. at 723 (quoting Morgan McChurch, ICLU Challenges Banishment Law for Iowa Sex
Offenders, IOWA ST. DAILY, July 17, 2003, at 1).
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commitment."' 8 ' In Doe v. Miller, John Doe IV, who was incarcerated
for drunk driving, was unable to leave jail because he could not find a
residence comporting with Iowa's residency restriction.82
III. IOWA RESIDENCY RESTRICTION'S CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES AND
ANALYSIS OF DOE V. MILLER'S TREATMENT OF THEM
The effects of residency restrictions on sex offenders have been
embraced in communities because of the communities' belief that indi-
viduals who choose, "because of life experiences or any other reason, to
sexually offend, especially against minors," can constitutionally have
their freedoms reduced.83 This belief is based on a refusal "to sympa-
thize with individuals who 'have dramatically affected their victims'
lives.' 84
In the face of emotionally charged approvals of sex offender resi-
dency restrictions, it is important that the Constitution is not forgotten.
Thus, the Iowa ACLU filed what it "believed to be the first class action
suit in the nation" on behalf of various "John Doe[s]."85 Each John Doe
who was subject to section 692A.2A "had committed a range of sexual
crimes, including indecent exposure, 'indecent liberties with a child,'
sexual exploitation of a minor, assault with intent to commit sexual
abuse, lascivious acts with a child, and second and third degree sexual
abuse. 86 Each John Doe could legally reside in only a small number of
areas under Iowa's statute and had difficulty finding housing in permit-
ted areas.87 For example, "John Doe XIV testified that the only available
compliant housing in his hometown ... was too expensive," so he and
his wife had to purchase a home forty-five miles from the town.88 "John
Doe VI was renting an apartment in compliance with [the residency
restriction], but had to move out when [his] landlord decided that he did
not want to rent to a sex offender."89 Additionally, John Doe VIII and
John Doe XI each applied to rent compliant apartments, "but their appli-
cations were denied because of their criminal records."90 However, in
contrast to the John Does' testimony, a parole and probation officer tes-
81. Id. at 723-724 (alteration in original) (quoting McChurch, supra note 80).
82. 298 F. Supp. 2d 844, 853-54 (S.D. Iowa 2004), rev'd, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005).
83. Duster, supra note 65, at 724 (quoting McChurch, supra note 80).
84. Id. (quoting McChurch, supra note 80).
85. Press Release, ACLU of Iowa, ACLU-IA Challenges Sex Offender Banishment Law with
Class Action Lawsuit (June 25, 2003), available at http://www.aclu-ia.org/News.aspx (follow
hyperlink next to "6/25/2003").
86. Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 705 (8th Cir. 2005).
87. Id. at 706.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 706-07.
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tified that "'virtually everyone' . . . whom he supervised between July
2002 and July 2003 was able to locate housing in compliance with [sec-
tion 692A.2A]."9 ' Regardless, the Iowa ACLU challenged section
692A.2A as a violation of several constitutional guarantees: the right to
travel, the right to due process, the prohibition on ex post facto laws, the
Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination, and the right
to family association and privacy. 92
The Eighth Circuit, in Doe v. Miller, addressed each of the constitu-
tional issues raised in the Iowa ACLU's complaint and concluded that
the ACLU's arguments were fruitless-the court upheld section
692A.2A.93
A. Due Process of Law Under the Fourteenth Amendment
1. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law." 94 The plaintiffs argued that section 692A.2A, in
violation of guaranteed procedural due process, both deprived them of
notice and foreclosed an opportunity for them to be heard.95
a. Notice
"Procedural due process 'insists that laws give the person of ordi-
nary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so
that he may act accordingly. "'96 The plaintiffs claimed that "some cities
in Iowa are unable to provide sex offenders with information about the
location of all schools" and child care facilities.97 Additionally, "it is
difficult to measure the restricted areas" because they are measured "'as
the crow flies' from a school or child care facility." 98 Thus, sex offend-
ers have a burdensome task in determining whether they are residing in a
permissible area.
Section 692A.2A's lack of notice is evidenced by the experience of
"Doug," one of the first sex offenders charged under the statute. 99 When
Doug was released from prison, he moved into a residence and contacted
91. Id. at 707.
92. Complaint at 2, Doe v. Miller, 298 F. Supp. 2d 844 (S.D. Iowa 2004) (No. 3:03-CV-
90067), 2003 WL 23908516.
93. See Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005).
94. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
95. Miller, 405 F.3d at 708-09.
96. Miller, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 877.
97. Miller, 405 F.3d at 708.
98. Id.
99. Duster, supra note 65, at 764 (citing All Things Considered, supra note 79).
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law enforcement to determine whether his chosen residence comported
with the statute, to no avail."° Doug measured the distance to the near-
est school twice in his car and believed he was further than 2,000 feet
from it.'0 ' However, Doug's residence was in fact within 2,000 feet of a
school because he did not measure the distance "as the crow flies."'
' 0 2
After two months of waiting to hear from law enforcement regarding his
inquiry, Doug was arrested for violating the statute.
10 3
In addition to sex offenders being denied notice as to the distances
of their homes to the nearest school or day-care facility, they are also
denied notice of where day-care facilities are located. While the loca-
tions of schools are easy for state officials to identify, day-care facilities
are more difficult to identify." n The only list of child-care facilities in
Iowa is not published. 0 5 However, even if it were published, changes in
the list are frequent, including 1,921 new listings between 2002 and
2003, and "[i]n several instances, the listings contain no physical address
or only a post office box number."'"
Clearly, Doug and other sex offenders are not provided notice by
section 692A.2A of whether they are in compliance with the statute.
However, the Eighth Circuit in Doe v. Miller disregarded the fact that,
despite their best efforts, sex offenders sometimes cannot determine
whether they are violating the statute; the court ultimately did not find
the statute to be unconstitutionally vague. 10 7 The court did state that "the
judicial doctrine of vagueness ... requires that a criminal statute 'define
the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can
understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."" 0 8 However, the
court articulated that "a criminal statute is not vague on its face unless it
is 'impermissibly vague in all of its applications."' 10 9 Additionally, "the
possibility that an individual might be prosecuted in a particular case in
a particular community despite his best efforts to comply with the





104. Id. at 765.
105. Doe v. Miller, 298 F. Supp. 2d 844, 849 (S.D. Iowa 2004) (stating that John Does
received a list of child-care facilities "only after filing an open records request and paying a
seventy dollar fee"), rev'd, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005).
106. Id.
107. See Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 708 (8th Cir. 2005).
108. Id.
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The court did, however, leave open the possibility that "[a] sex offender
subject to prosecution under those circumstances may seek to establish a
violation of due process through a challenge to enforcement of the stat-
ute as applied to him in a specific case."'II
b. Opportunity to Be Heard
Section 692A.2A states that a conviction alone makes the residency
restriction applicable.' 12 On the other hand, the Court in Kansas v. Hen-
dricks1 13 dealt with "a law that permitted the civil commitment of past
sex offenders"'1 4 upon a showing of "'mental abnormality or personal-
ity disorder which makes the person likely to engage in the predatory
acts of sexual violence."" 15 In upholding the statute, the Court relied on
the fact "'that a conviction standing alone did not make anyone eligible
for the burden imposed by that statute.' ",116 However, Iowa's residency
restriction does make a conviction sufficient to impose the restriction.'" 7
While Iowa's residency restriction may not infringe upon sex offenders'
liberty to the extent the law in Hendricks did," 8 it applies to a broader
class-all sex offenders-than the subset of sex offenders that the civil
commitment statute applied to.
The plaintiffs argued that the residency restriction "foreclose[d] an
'opportunity to be heard' because the statute provides no process for
individual determinations of dangerousness."'19 By stating that individ-
ual determinations of dangerousness are required, the plaintiffs demon-
strate their belief that residency restrictions-because their purposes, as
previously stated, are to protect the community from recidivating sex
offenders-are intended to keep only dangerous, not all, sex offenders
from residing near children. However, based on the text of section
692A.2A, the court found no such intent because the statute does not
state that it distinguishes between dangerous and nondangerous sex
offenders; the statute unambiguously distinguishes only between sex
111. Id.
112. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.2A(1) (West 2003).
113. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
114. Duster, supra note 65, at 762 (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 371).
115. Id. (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 352).
116. Id. (quoting Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 113 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
117. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.2A(1) (West 2003).
118. Because "liberty" is a subjective term, some sex offenders may feel as if their liberty is
infringed upon to a lesser extent if they are forced to live in a psychiatric hospital than if, like five
sex offenders in Florida, they are forced to live under a bridge with no electricity or clean water.
See Sarah E. Agudo, Comment, Irregular Passion: The Unconstitutionality and Inefficacy of Sex
Offender Residency Laws, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 307, 313 (2008) (citing John Zarrella & Patrick
Oppmann, Florida Housing Sex Offenders Under Bridge, CNN.coM, Apr. 6, 2007, http://www.
cnn.com/2007/LAW/04/05/bridge.sex.offenders/index.html).
119. Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 709 (8th Cir. 2005).
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offenders and non-sex offenders.120 Once a determination on whether an
individual is a sex offender has been made, "additional procedures are
unnecessary, because the statute does not provide a potential exemption
for individuals who seek to prove that they are not individually danger-
ous or likely to offend against neighboring schoolchildren."12 ' There is
no need for an opportunity to be heard, because a sex offender has
already had his opportunity to be heard when he was originally con-
victed as a sex offender.12 If, on the other hand, Iowa's residency
restriction stated that it only applies to "dangerous" sex offenders, then,
according to the court, all sex offenders would have the right to an indi-
vidual determination of dangerousness.
2 3
The court in Doe v. Miller did not read a requirement of dangerous-
ness into section 692A.2A.124 The court stated that the plain language of
the statute did not indicate such a requirement.12 5 However, because the
statute's purpose is to prevent sex offenders from recidivating against
minors, there is arguably an intent to require a showing of dangerous-
ness; there is no need to protect children from past sex offenders who
have no risk of recidivating. Additionally, there is no argument that
requiring a showing of dangerousness would be administratively burden-
some because "[a]t the time of the district court decision in Doe v.
Miller, Iowa had a process already in place which would have easily
allowed for an individualized determination of dangerousness."
1 26
2. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
In addition to arguing that section 692A.2A violates procedural due
process, the plaintiffs in Doe v. Miller "also assert[ed] that the residency
restriction is unconstitutional under the doctrine of substantive due pro-
120. See id. ("The restriction applies to all offenders who have been convicted of certain
crimes against minors, regardless of what estimates of future dangerousness might be proved in
individualized hearings.").
121. Id.; see also Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 4 (2003) ("[D]ue process
does not require the opportunity to prove a fact that is not material to the State's statutory
scheme.").
122. See Miller, 405 F.3d at 709.
123. See id.
124. See id.; see also Bains, supra note 6, at 490 ("In states like Arkansas and California that
do draw distinctions among classes of sex offenders, registrants may win the opportunity to
establish their membership in the group exempted from the statutory restrictions." (citing Weems
v. Little Rock Police Dep't, 453 F.3d 1010, 1019 (8th Cir. 2006))).
125. See Miller, 405 F.3d at 709.
126. Duster, supra note 65, at 762-63. In the District Court for the Southern District of Iowa,
which struck down section 692A.2A, Judge Pratt was "at a loss to understand why the State would
do away with" high, low, or moderate risk classifications used under sex offender registration
laws when imposing the more severe residency restrictions on sex offenders. Id. at 763 n.377
(quoting Doe v. Miller, 298 F. Supp. 2d 844, 877 (S.D. Iowa 2004), rev'd, 405 F.3d 700).
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cess."'1 27 They relied on Supreme Court decisions finding that "certain
liberty interests are so fundamental that a State may not interfere with
them... unless the infringement is 'narrowly tailored to serve a compel-
ling state interest.' 12 8 The plaintiffs believed that several "fundamental
rights" were infringed by the residency restriction, "including the 'right
to privacy and choice in family matters,' the right to travel, and 'the
fundamental right to live where you want.' "1
29
a. The Right to Personal Choice Regarding the Family
The plaintiffs argued that the residency restriction infringes on the
fundamental right to have "freedom of personal choice in matters of
marriage and family life."' 130 In doing so, they relied on the decision in
Moore v. City of East Cleveland,3 ' which held unconstitutional a zoning
ordinance that prohibited a grandmother from living with her two grand-
sons. 132 However, the court distinguished Moore from Miller in that the
ordinance in Moore operated directly on the family relationship, whereas
the residency restriction in Miller had only an indirect effect on the fam-
ily relationship. 133 The residency restriction only restricts where a resi-
dence may be located, not who may live with a sex offender, and
therefore does not infringe on the fundamental right of choice in family
matters. '31
However the court's argument that the residency restriction does
not restrict who may live with a sex offender is weak. Because the resi-
dency restriction nearly bans sex offenders from some communities, the
only way that those sex offenders can live with their families is if their
families also move out of the community. This is an unreasonable
request for the families of sex offenders, especially if a sex offender has
children. If a sex offender has a child, the sex offender may not live near
a school, so as to prevent him from being near children. However, if the
offender's child wants to live with his sex offender parent, the child also
has to live far from any school. Opponents of this view could argue that
the child can still reasonably get to school. But that argument would be
admitting that keeping sex offenders two-thousand feet from schools
does not meet the purpose of protecting the community-if two-thou-
127. Miller, 405 F.3d at 709.
128. Id. (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993)).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 710 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality
opinion)).
131. 431 U.S. 494.
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sand feet is close enough that a child can reasonably get to school, then
two-thousand feet is close enough that sex offenders might be tempted
to also be near the school.
b. Right to Travel
The Supreme Court has established components of the fundamental
right to travel, including "the right of a citizen of one State to enter and
to leave another State ... and, for those travelers who elect to become
permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that
State."' 35 The plaintiffs claim that the residency restriction violates the
right to travel because "by substantially limiting the ability of sex
offenders to establish residences in any town or urban area in Iowa," the
statute deters sex offenders "from migrating from other States to
Iowa."' 3 6 The court in Doe v. Miller disagreed by finding that there is
"free ingress and regress to and from" Iowa for sex offenders in addition
to the fact that the statute does not "discriminat[e] against citizens of
other States who wish to establish residence in Iowa."' 3 7 The court
stated that just because the prospects for affordable and convenient resi-
dence are less likely for sex offenders in Iowa than elsewhere, that does
not implicate the right to travel.' 38 Thus, the court determined that the
residency restriction does not violate the fundamental right to travel.
139
The right to travel is implicated when a state denies a person mov-
ing to that state of a necessity, thus denying a migrant the right to move
to a state.' 4° Doe v. Miller incorrectly equalizes "affordable" housing
and "convenient" housing.' 4 ' While "convenient" housing is surely not a
necessity, "affordable" housing is. If affordable housing exists in a state,
that state cannot deny a person the right to reside in the affordable hous-
ing. Denying that right is analogous to denying a person welfare bene-
fits, which was exactly what the Court in Saenz v. Roe found that a state
could not do, because without welfare benefits, a person cannot live in
that state. 1
42
Additionally, the right to travel is implicated when a state discrimi-
nates against a certain class of migrants to that state.' 43 In the case of
section 692A.2A, there is no doubt that it treats sex offenders who want
135. id. at 711 (quoting Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999)).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 712.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See Saenz, 526 U.S. 489.
141. See Miller, 405 F.3d at 712.
142. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 500-06.
143. Id. at 504-08.
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to move to Iowa differently than it treats other migrants. Therefore, the
court in Doe v. Miller was incorrect in holding that Iowa's residency
restriction does not violate the fundamental right to travel.
c. Right to Live Where You Want
The plaintiffs also urged the court to recognize a fundamental right
"to live where you want."'" However, consistent with other courts that
have not found that right to be a fundamental right,'45 Doe v. Miller
stated that the right to "live where you want" is not "deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition." '46 Thus, because the right to "live
where your want" is not fundamental, the court reviewed section
692A.2A to determine "whether it meets the standard of 'rationally
advancing some legitimate governmental purpose."" 4 7 The sex offend-
ers argued that the statute did not rationally advance the legitimate gov-
ernmental purpose of protecting children "because there is no scientific
study that supports the legislature's conclusion that excluding sex
offenders from residing within 2000 feet of a school or child care facility
is likely to enhance the safety of children." '148 The court, however,
rejected this argument because in the absence of precise statistical data
in an area where human behavior is unpredictable, the legislature has the
authority "to make judgments about the best means" to protect
children. 4 9
B. Ex Post Facto
The most litigated claim regarding sex offender residency statutes
is that the restrictions violate the constitutional guarantee that "[n]o state
shall ... pass any ... ex post facto Law." 5' An ex post facto law is "[a]
law that impermissibly applies retroactively, especially in a way that
negatively affects a person's rights, as by criminalizing an action that
was legal when it was committed."'' Thus, a law violates the Ex Post
Facto Clause when it imposes a greater punishment upon an individual
than the punishment that attached to the crime when the individual origi-
nally committed it.' 2 The plaintiffs in Doe v. Miller contended that sec-
144. Miller, 405 F.3d at 713.
145. See id. at 714 (citing Prostrollo v. Univ. of S.D., 507 F.2d 775, 781 (8th Cir. 1974)).
146. Id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
147. Id. (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993)).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Bains, supra note 6, at 485 (alterations in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.
1).
151. Duster, supra note 65, at 727 (alteration in original) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DIMONARY
620 (8th ed. 2004)).
152. See Miller, 405 F.3d at 718 (citing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798)).
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tion 692A.2A is unconstitutional under the Ex Post Facto Clause
"because it imposes retroactive punishment on those who committed a
sex offense prior to July 1, 2002," the date the statute went into effect. 3
Of importance to sex offender residency statutes is the purpose of the Ex
Post Facto Clause: "to prevent the legislature from abusing its authority
by enacting arbitrary or vindictive legislation retroactively applicable to
disfavored groups." 154
In finding that section 629A.2A does not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause, the court in Doe v. Miller followed the framework employed in
Smith v. Doe.'55 Under that framework, a court must first "ascertain
whether the legislature meant the statute to establish civil proceed-
ings." '1 56 If the legislature's intent was to establish criminal proceedings,
then that ends the inquiry, and the law violates the Ex Post Facto Clause
because it is necessarily punitive. 57 However, if the legislature intended
the law to be civil and nonpunitive, then the court must next determine if
the law is nonetheless "so punitive either in purpose or effect as to
negate" the legislature's nonpunitive intent.'58 In finding that a law,
which the legislature intended to be civil, is effectively a criminal pun-
ishment, a court needs "[o]nly the clearest proof."'
159
Even though section 692A.2A "does not contain any clear state-
ment of [its] purpose," the residency restriction is within chapter 692A
of the Iowa Code, which also contains Iowa's sex offender registration
system.1 60 The Supreme Court of Iowa has stated that the registration
system has a purpose of "protect[ing] society."1 6 1 "[W]here a legislative
restriction is an incident of the State's power to protect the health and
safety of its citizens, it will be considered as evidencing an intent to
exercise that regulatory power, and not a purpose to add to the punish-
ment." 1 6' Thus, a law with a purpose of "protecting society" indicates
that it is a "nonpunitive, regulatory law. ' 1 63 The court inferred from the
available evidence that section 692A.2A was intended "to protect the
health and safety of Iowa citizens," similar to the state's sex offender
153. Id.
154. Agudo, supra note 118, at 321-22 (citing State v. Cook, 700 N.E.2d 570, 580 (Ohio
1998)).
155. Miller, 405 F.3d at 718.





161. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Ex rel. S.M.M., 558 N.W.2d 405, 408 (Iowa 1997)).
162. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84. 93-94 (2003)).
163. See id.
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registration system. 64 Therefore, the court concluded that section
692A.2A was intended to be nonpunitive.165
Next, despite its finding that the legislative intent was for the law to
be a civil, nonpunitive regulatory scheme, the court considered whether
the law was nonetheless so punitive in effect as to negate that intent.
66
Smith v. Doe pointed to several factors initially drawn from Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 6 including "whether the law has been regarded in
our history and traditions as punishment, whether it promotes the tradi-
tional aims of punishment, whether it imposes an affirmative disability
or restraint, and whether it has a rational connection to a nonpunitive
purpose .... "168 While Doe v. Miller acknowledged these factors as an
aid in its analysis, it stressed that the factors are not dispositive and that
the "ultimate question always remains whether the punitive effects of the
law are so severe as to constitute the 'clearest proof that [the] statute...
should nonetheless be deemed to impose ex post facto punishment."'
' 69
The first factor the court used was whether the law has historically
been regarded as punishment. 7 ° The plaintiffs argued that section
692A.2A had the effect of banishing sex offenders.1 7 ' They also con-
tended that banishment has historically been regarded as punishment.72
However, while the court does not deny that banishment is a form of
punishment, it denies that Iowa's statute banishes sex offenders because
"[ilt does not 'expel' the offenders from their communities or prohibit
them from accessing areas near schools or child care facilities for...
any purpose other than establishing a residence."
1 73
While it is true that the residency restriction is not textually an out-
right banishment because it only limits where sex offenders can reside, it
sometimes has the effect of prohibiting residence in vast areas, which, in
this case, is sometimes the equivalent of banishment. For example,
some offenders are forced to remain in prison beyond their parole
dates, choosing between living with their families or complying with
the Act, going homeless or breaking the law, or simply leaving the
State because no community has a legal space for them. The differ-
ences between a law that would leave a man in prison or cause him to
go homeless rather than have him reside in the community, and an
164. Id. at 719.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
168. Miller, 405 F.3d at 719 (citing Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97 (2003)).
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order forever banishing him, are very slight. 17 4
If sex offenders cannot live near communities, the effect will likely be
that they will not make the trek to enter those communities at all. The
residency restriction's aim is the same as the aim of pure banishment
laws: "to remove the subjects of the laws from the areas that the laws
have been enacted to protect."' 75 Therefore, the residency restriction has
the same effect of banishment, and should thus be considered
punishment.
The second Mendoza-Martinez factor is "whether the law promotes
the traditional aims of punishment-deterrence and retribution."' 176 Doe
v. Miller stated that, while the law could have a deterrent effect, the
deterrent effect does not provide a strong enough inference that the resi-
dency restriction is punishment. 177 The court found that the primary pur-
pose of the restriction "is not to alter the offenders' incentive structure,"
but instead is to "reduce the likelihood of reoffense."' 78 The court's
analysis of whether the law is "retributive" was analogous to its "deter-
rence" analysis: while any restraint imposed on criminals is "at least
potentially retributive in effect," the purpose of the law is to protect the
health and safety of children. 7 9 It is difficult to see how the court came
to its conclusion. The factor is whether the law has the effect of promot-
ing deterrence and retribution, not whether the law's purpose is to pro-
mote deterrence and retribution. When the court conceded that section
692A.2A does in fact have the effect of deterrence and retribution, that
should have ended its discussion. Additionally, because the residency
restriction does not distinguish between dangerous and nondangerous
sex offenders in that it applies to all sex offenders, the restriction pro-
motes retribution at least regarding the nondangerous sex offenders
because there is no need to protect the public from them.
The third factor is "whether the law 'imposes an affirmative disa-
bility or restraint.' "180 "Restraint is typically defined as '[c]onfinement,
abridgement, or limitation.' "81 Doe v. Miller stated that "[i]f the disa-
bility or restraint is minor and indirect, its effects are unlikely to be
174. Duster, supra note 65, at 732-33 (quoting Doe v. Miller, 298 F. Supp. 2d 844, 869 (S.D.
Iowa 2004), rev'd, 405 F.3d 700) (internal quotation marks omitted).
175. Agudo, supra note 118, at 324.





181. Duster, supra note 65, at 731 (alteration in original) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICnONARY
1340 (8th ed. 2004)).
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punitive." 8 2 The court did acknowledge that section 692A.2A is more
disabling than some of the sex offender registration requirements previ-
ously review by the Supreme Court, but quickly moved on to the next
factor. 1 83
The final and "most significant" factor is "whether the regulatory
scheme has a 'rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose. ' "1 84 A
"rational connection" is not a demanding requirement, as it does not
require "a close or perfect fit with the nonpunitive aims."' 85 Therefore,
the court found that the legislature could reasonably conclude that the
residency restriction would protect the public by minimizing the risk
that past sex offenders would recidivate against minors. 8 6 The sex
offender plaintiffs, however, argued that the residency restriction is
excessive because it does not exempt nondangerous past sex offend-
ers.187 In striking down this argument, the court stated that "there are
never any guarantees that [sex offenders] won't reoffend" and "any sex
offender is always going to be of some concern forever.", 88 However, in
State v. Seering,'89 it was established that there is "no sociological or
empirical proof that any [residency] restriction . . . enhances the safety
of children.' 90 Nonetheless, because there was expert testimony at trial
stating that there is no such thing as a nondangerous sex offender,' 9 ' the
court concluded that the residency restriction has a rational connection
to the purpose of protecting the public.
In sum, the Eighth Circuit in Doe v. Miller incorrectly found that
all of the Mendoza-Martinez factors favored characterizing section
692A.2A as nonpunitive. In fact, three of the Mendoza-Martinez factors
suggest that the residency restriction is so punitive in effect as to negate
its nonpunitive, regulatory purpose.
C. Self-Incrimination
The plaintiffs argued that the residency restriction violates the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments' protection against self-incrimination. 192
182. Miller, 405 F.3d at 720 (alteration in original) (quoting Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 100
(2003)).




187. See id. at 722.
188. Id. (alteration in original).
189. No. CRIM AGIN006718, 2003 WL 21738894 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Apr. 30, 2003), rev'd, 701
N.W.2d 655 (Iowa 2005).
190. Duster, supra note 65, at 734 (emphasis omitted).
191. See Miller, 405 F.3d at 722.
192. Id. at 716.
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The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person ... shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." '93 The protection
against self-incrimination applies when a person faces a "substantial and
real hazard of subjecting [oneself] to criminal liability."'' 94 "The privi-
lege applies only to testimony about crimes that were already committed
or are in the process of being committed at the time the testimony is
given."' '9 The court in Doe v. Miller concluded that the residency
restriction does not violate the privilege against self-incrimination
because it does not compel a sex offender to be a witness against him-
self.19 6 Instead, section 692A.2A regulates where a sex offender may
reside; residing in a permissible area is not equivalent to providing any
information that might be used against the sex offender in a criminal
case. 197
Even though the residency restriction alone does not violate the
right against self-incrimination, when acting in concert with sex offender
registration laws, it makes those registration laws self-incriminatory.1 98
Because registration laws require a sex offender to disclose his address,
if he is living in an impermissible area under the residency restriction, he
is being forced to give incriminating testimony against himself-he
must admit that he is violating section 692A.2A. 9 9 In an analogous
case, United States v. Ansani, "[tihe court held that a statute requiring a
person to report his past business transactions to the government ...
violated the Fifth Amendment" because the person is forced to report
unlawful transactions, thus incriminating himself.
2 °
The privilege against self-incrimination can be waived if done vol-
untarily, knowingly, intelligently, and with a full understanding of the
consequences of waiving the right.20 ' Thus, to cure the Fifth Amend-
ment issue regarding sex offender residency restrictions in combination
with registration requirements, either one of the laws would have to be
repealed, or the registration requirement would have to be optional.20 2
Presumably, most sex offenders would not register if registering were
optional. Thus, the purpose of registration requirements-to trace where
sex offenders reside-would not be met, and law enforcement could not
193. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
194. Agudo, supra note 118, at 326 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.
Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 127 (1980)).
195. Id. (citing United States v. Harvey, 869 F.2d 1439, 1446 (1Ith Cir. 1989)).
196. Miller, 405 F.3d at 716.
197. Id.
198. Agudo, supra note 118, at 327.
199. Id.
200. Id. (citing United States v. Ansani, 138 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ill. 1955)).
201. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
202. Agudo, supra note 118, at 328.
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determine whether sex offenders were violating the residency restric-
tion.2 °3 Because the only way to determine whether a sex offender is
residing in a permissible area is to require him to provide his address,
residency restrictions would be useless if registration laws were either
repealed or made optional. Therefore, since registration requirements
and residency restrictions cannot constitutionally coexist, legislatures
would be wise to keep the registration laws to track where sex offenders
are residing and repeal the residency restrictions.
IV. CONCLUSION
This casenote illustrates the tension between the constitutional
rights provided to all citizens of the United States and the strong interest
in protecting children from dangerous sex offenders. It concludes that
"[n]o matter how repulsed society is concerning sex offenders, we can-
not place offenders in a unique, separate class bereft of constitutional
rights,"2' and contrary to the court's finding in Doe v. Miller, Iowa's
2,000-foot residency restriction on sex offenders is unconstitutional.
While the public may agree with the policy behind Doe v. Miller,
the court's decision did not go out of its way to limit the applicability of
its holding to the Iowa residency restriction exclusively. Thus, as the
public becomes increasingly supportive of residency restrictions, states
may begin expanding their restrictions beyond even the strictest local
residency ordinances. As those ordinances are challenged, states will
point courts towards Doe v. Miller, and courts will continue to find even
more restrictive residency statutes constitutional.
Even if courts continue to find sex offenders residency restrictions
constitutional, however, legislatures have the responsibility to limit them
to only sex offenders designated as "dangerous." While it may be
acceptable to protect children from "dangerous" sex offenders,
"nondangerous" past sex offenders are of no risk to children and thus
should not be subject to the residency restrictions.
203. See id.
204. Duster, supra note 65, at 778 (quoting Amy L. Van Duyn, Note, The Scarlet Letter
Branding: A Constitutional Analysis of Community Notification Provisions in Sex Offender
Statutes, 47 DRAKE L. REv. 635, 659 (1999)).
20101 1115
